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Abstract. The Sleeping Beauty Problem is a challenging puzzle in probabilistic reasoning, which has 
attracted enormous attention and still fosters ongoing debate. The problem goes as follows: 
Suppose that some researchers are going to put you to sleep. During the two days that your sleep 
will last, they will briefly wake you up either once or twice, depending on the toss of a fair coin 
(Heads: once; Tails: twice). After each waking, they will put you back to sleep with a drug that 
makes you forget that waking. When you are first awakened, to what degree should you believe 
that the outcome of the coin toss is Heads? Theoretically, the two candidate answers are 1/2 and 
1/3, the proponents of which are known as halfers and thirders, respectively. The present study 
examines for the first time the descriptive adequacy of both halfers’ and thirders’ analyses. Our 
results show that naïve reasoning does not simply fit either. Instead, they suggest that any 
psychologically adequate analysis of the Sleeping Beauty Problem should take account that the 
impact on probabilistic reasoning of information about one’s spatio-temporal location in the world 
is systematically discounted. 
Keywords: sleeping beauty problem; probability; reasoning; self-locating evidence.
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Sleeping Beauty goes to the lab: The psychology of self-locating evidence 
Introduction 
The Sleeping Beauty Problem (SBP) is a challenging puzzle in probabilistic reasoning. In its standard 
formulation the problem goes as follows: 
On a Sunday, some researchers are going to put you to sleep. During the two days that your sleep will last, 
they will briefly wake you up either once or twice, depending on the toss of a fair coin (Heads: once; Tails: 
twice). After each waking, they will put you back to sleep with a drug that makes you forget that waking. 
When you are awakened, to what degree ought you believe that the outcome of the coin toss is Heads? 
(Elga, 2000) 
Opinions on this puzzle are split between two camps. For so-called halfers, your credence in heads 
should be 1/2 on the probability scale. At the outset, you know all the details of the experiment, 
including that the coin is fair and that you will lose your memory of an earlier awakening. When 
you wake up, all new information you have is this: ‘I am presently undergoing either a Monday 
awakening or a Tuesday awakening.’ This type of information is often called “self-locating” 
information, and concerns one’s spatio-temporal location in the world. Self-locating information 
bears no relevant relation to the outcome of the coin flip, according to the halfer. Since before the 
experiment you know that the coin is fair, you should then retain a credence of P(Heads) = P(Tails) 
= 1/2 (Lewis, 2001). 
So-called thirders disagree and say your credence in heads should be 1/3 on the probability scale. 
If the Sleeping Beauty experiment were repeated many times, then, in the long run, about 1/3 of 
the total number of awakenings would happen on trials where the coin lands heads. Since 
credences should match long run relative frequencies, your credences should be P(Heads) = 1/3 
and P(Tails) = 2/3 on any particular awakening (Elga, 2000). 
The SBP has attracted enormous attention. It raises questions of unsuspected theoretical 
relevance for the foundations of probabilistic reasoning, belief update, decision-making, and 
beyond (Piccione & Rubinstein, 1997; Titelbaum, 2013). With the studies reported here, we test 
the descriptive adequacy of the standard halfer and thirder accounts: Does naïve uncertain 
reasoning comply with the former, the latter, or display yet some other pattern? In particular, we 
are interested in two questions: Do naïve reasoners acknowledge self-locating information as 
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relevant in the SBP? If they do, does the quantitative impact of self-locating information get 
discounted as compared to the impact of statistical information like the outcome of urn draws? 
 
Study 1 
Method. Two hundred and thirty-two participants (Mean age, 35.88, SD = 10.14, male 135, female 
97) were recruited using Amazon MTurk and randomly assigned to one of four possible 
experimental groups. As explained below, four conditions were sufficient to disentangle relevant 
predictions from standard halfer and thirder accounts, thus putting them to empirical test. 
Participants read one version of the SBP, and were asked to express their belief about the 
outcome of the coin toss described in the vignette. Answers were collected on a 7-point Likert-
scale ranging from ‘Certain that it was Heads and not Tails’ to ‘Certain that it was Tails and not 
Heads.’ 
Across the four groups we manipulated the type of evidence available to participants. We used an 
adapted version of Elga’s (2000) as Basic condition. In the No Evidence condition, only one waking 
was said to occur regardless of the outcome of the coin toss. In the Plus condition, multiple 
awakenings (five) would happen after Tails. Finally, in the Ball condition, the available evidence 
only consisted of draws from an urn (see Appendix for the stimuli we used). 
Halfers and thirders agree on their predictions that P (Tails) = 1/2 in the No Evidence condition, 
and that P (Tails) = 5/6 in the Ball condition. For the Basic and Plus conditions, instead, halfers and 
thirders disagree. Halfers predict that P (Tails) = 1/2 in both the Basic and the Plus condition. 
Instead, thirders predict that P (Tails) = 2/3 in the Basic condition, and that P (Tails) = 5/6 in the 
Plus condition. 
Results. A Kruskal-Wallis test showed that each of our four manipulations (Table 1) had a 
significant effect on participants’ judgment, H (3) = 22.73, p = .000, r = .3. Across conditions, we 
also found significant differences concerning the degree of certainty that the outcome of the coin 
toss was Tails (ranging in 4-7, i.e. from “equally likely” to “certain”), H (3) = 41.19, p = .000, r = .4. 
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Table 1. Mean scores for each group (scores ranging from 1 to 7). 
Conditions No Evidence Basic Plus Ball 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Coin (Study 1) 3.83 .78 3.98 1.05 4.40 1.15 4.67 1.46 
Pill (Study 2) 3.92 1.04 3.90 1.28 4.23 1.71 4.67 1.33 
Combined (Study 1&2) 3.87 .91 3.94 1.17 4.32 1.46 4.67 1.39 
 
 
Study 2 
Method. Study 1 revealed that participants’ judgments of the SBP depended on the type of 
evidence available. In particular, its results are consistent with the idea that naïve reasoners 
acknowledge self-locating information as relevant in the SBP (Plus condition). Study 2 examined 
whether these results may have been affected by a focus on the coin mechanism in the question 
participants were asked. 
A new sample of two hundred and twenty-nine participants (Mean age, 33.82, SD = 10.82, male 
131, female 98) was recruited from MTurk, and randomly assigned to one of four possible 
experimental groups as in Study 1. Unlike in Study 1, participants did not express their belief about 
the outcome of the coin toss. Instead, participants expressed their belief about the pill they were 
administered in the situation they were asked to consider (see Appendix). Responses were again 
collected on a 7-point Likert-scale. 
Results. A Kruskal-Wallis test showed that all groups differed significantly in their answers, H (3) = 
11.64, p = .009, r = .3. All groups also differed significantly in their certainty of a Tails outcome, H 
(3) = 14.80, p = .002, r = .3. 
A Mann-Whitney Test showed that there was no significant difference between the answers of the 
participants of this study (M= 4.19) and the answers of participants from Study 1 (M = 4.07), p = 
.24. Aggregating data from both studies, the difference between the Basic and the NoEvidence 
condition did not reach significance, p = .42. However, a significant difference was found between 
the Plus and the Basic condition, p = .03, d = .29, and between the Ball and the Plus condition, p = 
.03, d = .25. 
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Discussion 
Our results show that naïve reasoning in the SBP does not simply fit either the halfer or the thirder 
analyses. The halfer’s analysis squares with the lack of a significant difference between the Basic 
and No Evidence conditions, but is at odds with our finding that the Plus and Basic conditions 
reliably differed (for the halfer, one should have P(Tails) = 1/2 in both cases). The thirder’s 
analysis, on the other hand, is supported by the latter result, but clashes with our finding that the 
probability of Tails is reliably judged to be higher in the Ball than in the Plus condition (for the 
thirder, one should have P(Tails) = 5/6 in both cases). 
Given that no standard theoretical analysis accounts for observed behavior, one might be tempted 
to complement a thirder framework with an appeal to cognitive limitations akin to those arising in 
other known puzzles of probabilistic reasoning. In particular, in a thirder perspective, the SBP may 
seem structurally similar to the Monty Hall problem. And Monty Hall is known to invite 1/2 as a 
largely dominant response because of the representational and computational difficulty of the 
task for the unaided human mind (Krauss & Wang, 2003). 
Although initially appealing, this remark is not sufficient to explain our result. In fact, a thirder 
would be compelled to see the same kind of structural mathematical analogy between the Ball 
and the Plus variants in our experiment. However, this did not prevent participants to shift 
significantly towards the Tails hypothesis in the latter condition. For the same reason, a thirder 
would also be unable to account for our data by relying on a general tendency to conservatism in 
probability updating (Edwards, 1968; Tentori et al., 2007). 
In summary, our results are consistent with a pattern of judgment that is qualitatively different 
from either the halfer or thirder analyses, where self-locating evidence is acknowledged as 
relevant but its quantitative impact is largely discounted as compared to more standard statistical 
evidence as the outcome of urn draws. Other factors were previously shown to have such diluting 
effects on reasoning with evidence, such as second-order uncertainty about the values of a 
relevant statistical distribution (Tentori, Crupi, and Osherson, 2010). Although mixed or integrated 
models of the SBP exist (Bostrom, 2007; Cisewski et al., 2015), this particular diluting effect is out 
of their reach so far, and should therefore be integrated in a satisfactory descriptive account of 
reasoning with self-locating information. 
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Appendix 
Stimuli used in Study 1 
BASIC condition 
On a Sunday, you will be administered one of two pills, depending on the toss of a fair coin 
(HEADS: regular pill; TAILS: strong pill). You will not be told the outcome of the coin toss, and the 
two pills look identical. However, you know the following. 
If the coin landed HEADS: 
– the pill you’re given on Sunday (regular pill) will make you sleep for one day; 
– then you will wake up (on Monday). 
If the coin landed TAILS: 
– the pill you’re given on Sunday (strong pill) will make you sleep for one day; 
– then you will wake up a first time (on Monday), and shortly afterwards fall back asleep for 
another day, forgetting that you just woke up; 
– then you will finally wake up a second time (on Tuesday). 
Imagine you’ve just woken up. You don’t know which day it is, and you do not know whether or 
not you have already woken up before. You are now asked to express your belief about the 
outcome of the coin toss that was made on Sunday: Do you think it was more probably HEADS or 
TAILS?  
After waking up, I would think the coin toss on Sunday is: 
[ ] Certain to have been HEADS and not TAILS 
[ ] Much more likely to have been HEADS and not TAILS 
[ ] Slightly more likely to have been HEADS and not TAILS 
[ ]  Equally likely to have been HEADS or TAILS 
[ ]  Slightly more likely to have been TAILS and not HEADS 
[ ] Much more likely to have been TAILS and not HEADS 
[ ] Certain to have been TAILS and not HEADS 
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NO EVIDENCE condition 
[same introductory paragraph as above] 
If the coin landed HEADS: 
– the pill you’re given on Sunday (regular pill) will make you sleep for one day; 
– then you will wake up (on Monday).  
If the coin landed TAILS: 
– the pill you’re given on Sunday (strong pill) will make you sleep for two days; 
– then you will wake up (on Tuesday). 
Imagine you’ve just woken up. You don’t know which day it is. You are now asked to express your 
belief about the outcome of the coin toss that was made on Sunday: Do you think it was more 
probably HEADS or TAILS?  
[same response scale as above] 
 
PLUS condition 
[same introductory paragraph as above] 
If the coin landed HEADS: 
– the pill you’re given on Sunday (regular pill) will make you sleep for one day; 
– then you will wake up (on Monday). 
If the coin landed TAILS: 
– the pill you’re given on Sunday (strong pill) will make you sleep for one day; 
– then you will wake up a first time (on Monday), and shortly afterwards fall back asleep for 
another day, forgetting that you just woke up; 
– the same will happen on each of the following days, until you finally wake up a fifth time (on 
Friday). 
Imagine you’ve just woken up. You don’t know which day it is, and you do not know whether or 
not you have already woken up any time before. You are now asked to express your belief about 
the outcome of the coin toss that was made on Sunday: Do you think it was more probably HEADS 
or TAILS?  
[same response scale as above] 
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BALLS condition 
On a Sunday, a blue ball is placed in an empty and opaque urn in front of you, and you will then be 
administred one of two pills, depending on the toss of a fair coin (HEADS: regular pill; TAILS: strong 
pill). You will not be told the outcome of the coin toss, and the two pills look identical. However, 
you know the following. 
If the coin landed HEADS: 
– the pill you’re given on Sunday (regular pill) will make you sleep for one day; 
– meanwhile, one red ball will be placed in the opaque urn;  
– then you will wake up (on Monday), and draw a ball from the urn. 
If the coin landed TAILS: 
– the pill you’re given on Sunday (strong pill) will make you sleep for two days; 
– meanwhile, five red balls will be placed in the opaque urn;  
– then you will wake up (on Tuesday), and draw a ball from the urn. 
Imagine you’ve just woken up. You don’t know which day it is. You draw a ball from the urn: the 
ball is red. You are now asked to express your belief about the outcome of the coin toss that was 
made on Sunday: Do you think it was more probably HEADS or TAILS?  
[same response scale as above] 
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Stimuli used in Study 2 
BASIC condition 
On a Sunday, you will be administred one of two pills, depending on the toss of a fair coin (heads: 
REGULAR pill; tails: STRONG pill). You will not be told the outcome of the coin toss, and the two 
pills look identical. However, you know the following. 
If the coin landed heads: 
– the pill you’re given on Sunday (REGULAR pill) will make you sleep for one day; 
– then you will wake up (on Monday). 
If the coin landed tails: 
– the pill you’re given on Sunday (STRONG pill) will make you sleep for one day; 
– then you will wake up a first time (on Monday), and shortly afterwards fall back asleep for 
another day, forgetting that you just woke up; 
– then you will finally wake up a second time (on Tuesday). 
Imagine you’ve just woken up. You don’t know which day it is, and you do not know whether or 
not you have already woken up before. You are now asked to express your belief about the pill 
you were administered on Sunday: Do you think it was more probably the REGULAR pill or the 
STRONG pill? 
After waking up, I would think the pill I was administered on Sunday is: 
[ ]  Certain to have been REGULAR and not STRONG 
[ ] Much more likely to have been REGULAR and not STRONG 
[ ]  Slightly more likely to have been REGULAR and not STRONG 
[ ] Equally likely to have been REGULAR or STRONG 
[ ]  Slightly more likely to have been STRONG and not REGULAR 
[ ]  Much more likely to have been STRONG and not REGULAR 
[ ]  Certain to have been STRONG and not REGULAR 
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NO EVIDENCE condition 
[same introductory paragraph as above] 
If the coin landed heads: 
– the pill you’re given on Sunday (REGULAR pill) will make you sleep for one day; 
– then you will wake up (on Monday).  
If the coin landed tails: 
– the pill you’re given on Sunday (STRONG pill) will make you sleep for two days; 
– then you will wake up (on Tuesday). 
Imagine you’ve just woken up. You don’t know which day it is. You are now asked to express your 
belief about the pill you were administered on Sunday: do you think it was more probably the 
REGULAR or the STRONG pill? 
[same response scale as above] 
 
PLUS condition 
[same introductory paragraph as above] 
If the coin landed heads: 
– the pill you’re given on Sunday (REGULAR pill) will make you sleep for one day; 
– then you will wake up (on Monday). 
If the coin landed tails: 
– the pill you’re given on Sunday (STRONG pill) will make you sleep for one day; 
– then you will wake up a first time (on Monday), and shortly afterwards fall back asleep for 
another day, forgetting that you just woke up; 
– the same will happen on each of the following days, until you finally wake up a fifth time (on 
Friday). 
Imagine you’ve just woken up. You don’t know which day it is, and you do not know whether or 
not you have already woken up any time before. You are now asked to express your belief about 
the pill you were administered on Sunday: Do you think it was more probably the REGULAR pill or 
the STRONG pill? 
[same response scale as above] 
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BALLS condition 
On a Sunday, a blue ball is placed in an empty and opaque urn in front of you, and you will then be 
administered one of two pills, depending on the toss of a fair coin (heads: REGULAR pill; tails: 
STRONG pill). You will not be told the outcome of the coin toss, and the two pills look identical. 
However, you know the following. 
If the coin landed heads: 
– the pill you’re given on Sunday (REGULAR pill) will make you sleep for one day; 
– meanwhile, one red ball will be placed in the opaque urn;  
– then you will wake up (on Monday), and draw a ball from the urn. 
If the coin landed tails: 
– the pill you’re given on Sunday (STRONG pill) will make you sleep for two days; 
– meanwhile, five red balls will be placed in the opaque urn;  
– then you will wake up (on Tuesday), and draw a ball from the urn. 
Imagine you’ve just woken up. You don’t know which day it is. You draw a ball from the urn: the 
ball is red. You are now asked to express your belief about the pill you were administered on 
Sunday: Do you think it was more probably the REGULAR pill or the STRONG pill? 
[same response scale as above] 
